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Abstract 
Electronic markets use information technology to disseminate information on 
prices, quantities, and buyer and supplier identities. In spite of the recognized 
benefits of electronic markets, increased visibility and transparency may introduce 
imperfections, and create profitable opportunities to bypass markets that generates 
the information. In the U.S. securities markets, dissemination of market data has 
equipped several firms to develop competing, off-exchange trading mechanisms 
that rely on market price data, but whose transactions bypass the established 
market. Concern is rising that the growing volume of trading occumng away 
from the main market may reduce liquidity, and increase transactions costs. A 
simulation model of securities trading in a continuous auction market (similar to 
the market structure of the New York Stock Exchange) is used to examine the 
market quality effects of increasing levels of trading activity through an off- 
exchange dealer. Market characteristics, such as transactions costs, are measured 
as off-exchange trading increases from zero percent to 20 percent of the total 
trading volume. The results indicate that competition from an alternative trading 
venue reduces some trading costs borne by investors. Contrary to regulatory 
goals, however, off-market trading expands the role of profit-seeking dealers, and 
lowers the probability that some investors' orders will execute. 
I. Introduction 
Competition, innovation, and the drive to reduce costs are moving many industries 
toward electronic markets. Customers of airlines, mortgage-providers, and hospital suppliers 
are likely to perform most of their transactions electronically [HOPP90][KEME93][SHOR91]. 
Although screen-based commerce and electronic transactions offer benefits, closer analysis 
reveals shortcomings in some forms of electronic marketplaces. In some cases, electronic 
market systems can reduce economic benefits available to buyers and sellers. This paper 
examines in detail a controversy currently faced by securities regulators in the U.S. concerning 
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"off-exchange" trading systems.' The economic effects of widely-accessible, screen-based price 
dissemination systems are shown to have some detrimental effects on market users, and the 
quality of the overall market. The result is that market transparency may complicate the 
standard arguments for increasing applications of electronic markets. In particular, whenever 
markets provide not just a buyer-seller matching function, but a price-determination function as 
well. 
Electronic markets are inter-organizational systems for bringing buyers and sellers 
together. The principal benefits of procurement through an electronic market are reduced search 
costs, and greater efficiencies compared to internal, vertically-integrated production. The 
reduction in search costs has been termed the "electronic-brokerage effect" by Malone et al. 
(1987). Compared to manually contacting potential suppliers or buyers, an electronic market 
enables more rapid search of a great number of potential vendors or customers, and a move 
closer to the economic ideal of a per f~t ly  competitive market [BAKOgl]. A second benefit is 
lower production costs due to economies of scale and scope available to a vendor or supplier. 
By serving many customers, a vendor or specialized producer will have higher volumes and 
lower costs. Falling transactions costs and coordination costs for external procurement should 
reduce firms' reliance on hierarchical relationships with vertically integrated in-house units. 
While the principal benefits of electronic markets have been explored, several features 
of electronic markets have not been thoroughly studied. The features examined here are market 
transparency and the effects of market bypass. Transparency, or the visibility of activity on an 
electronic market, is generally considered advantageous. When prices are available to all on 
screen-displays, monitoring can improve and competition may intensify. Buyers or sellers can 
determine whether they are getting the k s t  price. Information technology (IT) introduced at the 
time of the London stock market's Big Bang reforms in 1986, led traders to abandon centuries- 
old traditions of face-to-face trading for a screen and telephone dealing system [CLEMgO]. 
Average trading margins (the spread between buying and selling prices) fell about 25 percent 
from pre-Big Bang levels, and a majority of the respondents to a survey of Exchange members 
found the screen-based system provided better access to market information and improved their 
quickness in responding to changes in trading conditions. Clemons (1992) shows how the 
' Recent studies of policy issues include "Securities Trading: SEC Action Needed to Address 
National Market System Issues" by the General Accounting Office (1990), "Electronic Bulls and Bears" 
by the Office of Technology Assessment (1990), and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Market 
2000 study, due in late 1993. 
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monitoring capabilities of electronic markets restrict the chances for opportunism in an out- 
sourcing or procurement relationship. With lower ex-ante risk of worse-than-market prices or 
less favorable terms, firms can work together as "virtually integrated" units. Thus, electronic 
market transparency facilitates closer coordination between partner firms, and greater production 
efficiencies. 
Although transparency and the ability to monitor, bring economic benefits, they also 
introduce the risk that the electronic market will be bypassed, or used as a tool to limit 
competition. The U.S. Justice Department recently forced several airlines, including American, 
Delta, USAir, and United, to stop providing advance details of fare changes over computer 
reservation systems (CRSs) [MCD093]. It was alleged that collusive signalling was occurring 
among the 2 million price and schedule changes made daily over the CRSs. It was charged that 
airlines would post higher prices in hopes of encouraging competitors to match the fares, and 
to draw customers into buying tickets to avoid prices incrases. The solution, imposed in the 
Justice Department's consent decree, prohibits airlines from giving advance notice of fare 
changes, or the dates of fare sales. Changes to CRS data on airline fares can now only occur 
once they have been advertised to the public. The changes, in effect, bring airline tickets into 
a spot market structure in which prices are onIy good at the time they are offered, with the 
display of future fares and advance notice of changes not allowed. 
Beginning with the introduction of the telegraph by Morse in 1844, IT has been used to 
distribute prices from financial markets. Until recently, however, a single market tended to 
dominate trading in any particular issue because communication technology was too primitive 
to allow transactions to occur without face-to-face contact among traders. Today, the securities 
of major U.S. companies can be traded in multiple markets,' and markets increasingly compete 
with one another to attract l iq~idity.~ Paradoxically, financial markets that introduce market 
systems to enhance their transparency, increase the threat of their market being bypassed. The 
greater the visibility of prices and market activity, the more attractive it is to trade outside using 
exchange-generated prices and quotes. Fkfore 1978, last trade prices, but not actual quotes, 
A widely-held security such as AT&T's common stock is "cross-listed" and trades on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), regional stock exchanges in Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, 
San Francisco, and through over-the-counter, or "third-market" dealers, and in several overseas stock 
markets. 
Several of the regional exchanges have introduced automated small order execution systems. The 
Chicago-based Midwestern Stock Exchange's MAX system, introduced in 1980, has the largest volume. 
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were disseminated from U.S. stock exchanges. A trader or investor had to enter the market just 
to find out what trading prices were currently available. Traders with any interest in a security 
participated in the price discovery process by asking about the price, or executing a trade. 
Today, exchange-generated quotes are electronically available to firms away from the 
market, and the technology has created close substitutes for exchange markets in a number of 
"third-market" dealing firms. An off-exchange dealer trades from offices using price feeds 
carrying market quotations from the NYSE, and other exchanges. For a principal marker center 
such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), today's extensive information dissemination 
means that traders can transact at prices verifiably as good as those on the established market. 
Generally, the alternative trading mechanisms have less overhead expense, and will offa 1 br ower 
commissions and trading fees. 
The growing volume of trading occurring away from the main market may reduce 
liquidity, and increase transactions costs. Rather than increasing competition and improving the 
performance, electronic market facilities may reduce market quality. In this paper we analyze 
the effect of off-market trading through a simulation of market trading with and without, off- 
exchange dealing activity. As this research will demonstrate, transparency may undermine some 
market benefits (the "gains from trade"), or weaken the position of the market provider. 
11. Off-Exchange Trading and Regulatory Objectives 
The goals for a "National Market System (NMS)" were set out in the Amendments to the 
Securities Acts of 1934, which were passed in 1975 by the U.S. Congress. The Amendments' 
objectives were to: 
(1) enhance the economic efficiency and lower the costs of transaction 
(2) ensure fair competition among brokers, dealers, and markets 
(3) ensure the broad availability of information on quotations and transactions 
(4) provide the opportunity, consistent with efficiency and best execution, for 
investors' orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93- 15 
Market Transparency and Bypass Page 5 
The  third objective - increasing market transparency - is believed to attract investors 
to a market, and improve liquidity. Yet, with perfect transparency, traders can make use of the 
exchange's prices without paying the costs of running the exchange. Off-exchange trading is  
more viable the more broadly accurate quotation information is made available. I t  is unclear, 
however, whether the ability to trade away from the central market is consistent with the NMS 
goals. 
MARKET STRUCTURE TERMINOLOGY - Glossary: 
The difference between the highest bid (to buy) quote and the lowest ask or offer (to sell) quote for 
a security is called the bid-ask spread. The spread is a transactions cost paid by investors. It can, 
however, provides a source of profits to dealer intermediaries in a market. Increased competition 
between markets and dealers is expected to narrow spreads. 
In a continuous auction market, investors submit buy and sell orders usually through a broker. An 
order can be a market order, an instruction to buy or sell at the best available price in the market 
at that moment. Investors can also place limit orders by setting a limit price as a upper bound on 
the most they will pay to buy, or a lower bound on what they will sell for. 
Dealers in a market post bid and offer quotes, and act as intermediaries buying and selling with 
investors. Dealers {or market makers) hold inventories of the securities they "make a market in", 
and face the risk that price changes will adversely affect the value of their position. The 
NASDAQ market in the U.S. is a screen-based market displaying the quotes of competing dealers. 
The specialist is a regulated dealer on the floor of the NYSE. There is one specialist assigned to 
each stock to oversee trading and enforce the auction's rules. Only when there is an imbalance 
between buy and sell interest, does a specialist trade as a dealer from his or her own inventory in 
the stock. At any time during the trading day the best NYSE bid or offer quote may belong to the 
specialist, or be a limit order submitted by an investor. In practice, the specialist participates as a 
buyer or seller in about 20% of all NYSE trading volume. 
Liquidity is the most important determinant of the attractiveness of a market, and reflects the 
market's ability to convert between securities and cash, rapidly and with minimal impact on the 
market's price. A measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread; narrower spreads reflect lower 
transactions costs and greater liquidity. 
Transparency in a market enables investors to know the sizes and prices of recently completed 
trades, and the sizes and quotes at which the next trades can be expected to execute. The research 
literature suggests that transparency is good for investors and enhances market competitiveness and 
fairness [SCHW88]. 
lMarket Structure and Information Systems in the U.5, The NYSE is largest stock market 
in the world, and traded shares worth $6.9 billion daily on average in 1992. A s  an auction 
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market, the NYSE "exposes" all orders and allows for direct investor-to-investor transactions. 
The NYSE market is structured as a continuous auction with a specialist assigned to each issue. 
There are 420 specialists with 46 specialist firms trading on the 37,000 square foot floor. 
Another 1,100 floor traders, brokers, and messengers make up the floor crowd. The role of the 
specialist is to oversee trading in their assigned securities, and to maintain a continuous bid and 
offer price. The specialist ensures that orders are executed according to priorities that ensure 
"best execution", meaning that orders to sell trade against the orders of buyers that are willing 
to pay the most for the shares. When investor orders are not sufficient to maintain "a fair and 
orderly" market, the specialist will trade as a principal from his or her own inventory. 
In 1978, the Consolidated Quotation System (CQS) began to provide a screen display of 
the bid and offer quotes on the New York, American, and the regional stock markets, and the 
NASDAQ system for over-the-counter (OTC) stocks. The CQS is an electronic facility that has 
encouraged third-market trading by increasing the central market's transparency. In 1978, 2.4 
percent of trading volume in NYSE-listed stocks occurred via "third-market" dealers. The 
market share of the third market grew to 3.1 % in 1985, and was 7.8 % in 1992. 
The typical third market firm provides its customers, who are brokerage firms handling 
the orders of their retail investor customers, the ability to buy and sell at the best quotes 
available in any of the markets linked by the CQS. Order sizes are usually limited to 5,000 
shares. Larger orders may be handled but only on request and with some negotiation on price. 
The third market firm trades as a dealer, buying and selling from their own inventory and 
generally holding a "long" (positive inventory) or "short" (negative inventory) position4 in the 
stock. When the volume of buy orders and sell orders received is equivalent, the third market 
dealer earns the spread between the bid and offer quotes posted on the CQS. 
Regulatory Issues. In July 1992, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced 
it was undertaking "a study of the U.S. equities markets and of the regulatory environment in 
which those market operate." Among the issues to be addressed in the Markets 2000 study 
include proprietary and third market trading systems, and market transparency. Proponents of 
third market dealers argue that they have successfully introduced trading innovations and their 
trading services provide beneficial competition to the established markets, and the specialist 
A short position reflects the selling of securities that the trader does not own. To "cover" the 
short position, the trader must later purchase shares. Trading profits from a short position are realized 
if the price drops. 
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"monopoly." At the same time, opponents of third market trading claim that it inhibits the full 
consolidation of trading order flow at a central market location such as the NYSE. Furthermore, 
foes argue that third market dealers employ "parasitic pricing" or "price piggybacking" because 
they rely on market transparency provided by the exchange, but they do not contribute 
commensurately to the price discovery process. Not surprisingly, a kgal debate has arisen over 
the "property rights" for stock market price quotations [MUHL92]. Contending views are that 
they are owned by the public, or that they belong to the exchange, or that they belong to the 
investors or traders that provided them. 
Other electronic markets for securities trading have developed in recent years. Among 
these are Instinet, Posit, The Crossing Network, the Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX) in the 
U.S., as well as Globex for futures contracts and options. Globex was launched in July, 1992, 
and in October 1992 was handling 2,500 futures contracts a day via 230 linked terminals in its 
after-hours trading sessions. The current electronic volumes are small compared to the 1.2 
million contracts traded daily on the floors of the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. These screen-based markets are structured differently than those offered 
by third market dealers, and will not be considered in detail here. 
111. Modeling Securities Trading and Market Bypass 
Missing in the current debate on off-exchange trading systems has been a controlled study 
of the effects of third market activity. Because third market dealers provide the same prices as 
quoted in the main market, there is no systematic violation of fairness, and they appear to 
sharpen competition. To test for the effects of market bypass, we develop a model of the 
submission of trading orders to a market and the execution of trades. We evaluate market 
differences under identical order flow conditions, controlling only for the relative division of 
order flow between the main market and an off-exchange trading mechanism. Only by leaving 
out many important institutional details can a tractable solution be obtained [GARM76]. Instead, 
we incorporate institutional details affecting securities markets, and use simulation to evaluate 
the models. 
Components of the Market Model. In the simulation model, assumptions are made about the 
arrival process of investors' orders, elasticity of supply and demand, and order placement 
strategies, price volatility, and the proportions of market and limit orders. 
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Order Book. The NYSE's auction market is based on an order book containing 
investors' orders ranked by price (in '/sth of a dollar units), and time of arrival. The order book 
also contains the specialist's bid and ask quotes (Bs and A,). Figure 1 illustrates one possible 
state of the order book at some time during the trading day. The current highest bids to buy are 
at $ 3 2 4  for 5 units, and the lowest offer to sell is at $334" for 10 units. 
FIGURE 1 
Large orders can have "market impact", and can move prices up for large buyers, and force 
them down for larger sellers. In the market situation illustrated, a seller of 10 units would 
receive a price of 32-%, because the cumulative volume at the best bid is only 5. If the market 
sell order was for 16, it would also execute at 32-%, but the specialist would participate as a 
buyer of 6 units. The functioning of the market for large orders is consistent with observed 
"block trade" discounts for large sell orders and premiums for large buy orders. 
Specialist-Auction Market 
Limit Order Book 
Order Arrival. Market supply and demand functions are assumed to result from the 
aggregated net demand schedules of investors. The functions are positively and negatively 
sloped respectively in price. Price-dependent Poisson processes were used to model the arrival 
of orders to the market.5 The order interarrival time, T,  is exponentially distributed with P ,  
equal to the mean interarrival time at time t. The mean interarrival time is set at the beginning 
of each experiment and assumed to hold constant. A realization at time t is thus, T, = q@). 
The supply and demand structure follows closely those previously developed in the market 
Bids 
Orders Qty. 
Using time-stamped transactions data on six stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange, a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test fails to reject the null hypothesis of exponential interarrival in 
17 out of 22 sample periods at the .10 level of significance. We would expect to reject in just over 2 
cases due to random realizations. While the fit is not perfect, the Poisson assumption appears sufficiently 
justified for capturing the typical behavior of the or&r arrival process. 
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microstructure literature [GARM76][MEND87]. The order arrival rates are price dependent 
processes. Buy and sell arrival rates are step functions of the difference between the quoted 
price and the equilibrium value of the security, 
FIGURE 2 
Garman termed the intersection of the supply and demand functions a "stochastic 
equilibrium " . 
Demandlbuy orders D(p) :AB(pi,p*) = a, + a,(p,* -pi) for p,*-pi < 6 
h,(pi,p*) = a, for p,' < pi XB(pi,p*) = a,  + a26 for p,'-pi > 6 
Supplylsell orders S@): XS(pj,pa) = a, + a,(pj-pi*) for pi-p,* < 6 
hs(pj,p? = a, for p,' > pi XS(pj,pt) = a, + a26 for pj-p: > 6 
Representations of order generating process with finer granularity that incorporate utility 
maximization by individual traders' are available [MEND85]{HAND91]. However we use statistical 
aggregates to describe group behavior. which Garman (1976) likens to a physicist that is not concerned 
with individual particles but with representations that describe their grouped behavior. 
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The constant a, reflects the proportion of arrivals that are market orders. The coefficient a, 
reflects the sensitivity of buyers and sellers to discrepancies between available prices and the 
equilibrium value. The parameter, 6, is the range around the equilibrium value from which limit 
prices for limit orders are generated. At a price p, lower than the equilibrium value at the time, 
p,', the arrival rate of buy orders will exceed the rate of sell order arrivals. The resulting 
market buy orders and limit order bids will exceed the quantity of sell orders for below- 
equilibrium values. The excess demand cause prices to rise since in expectation, orders will 
trade against the lowest offer quotes, and add new, possibly higher priced bid quotes. 
Supply. Demand, and Elasticity. The order flow is generated by simulated traders who 
are either potential buyers or sellers, bidding for, or offering, between one and twenty-five units 
of the security. Traders use either limit orders or market orders. Some limit orders will 
execute on arrival in the market, if there is a suitable counterpart order. For instance, a limit 
order to sell 3 units at 32-7/s will execute immediate if there is a bid of 32-7/8 or higher available 
for 3 or more unit. The supply and demand functions specify arrival rates that are assumed to 
be symmetric, step functions in '18th increments around the equilibrium price. The probable 
prices of arriving limit orders were obtained in several interviews with NYSE specialists and 
floor trading staff. 
TABLE 1 
Amount : 
above p* (sell orders) 
below p* (buy orders) 
Probability , 10% 14% - 14% 16% 16% 12% 8% 5% 5% 
Order Size. Buy and sell order submitted to the market vary in size from 1 to 25 units. 
This was a convenient normalization that reflects the empirically observable range of order sizes. 
The units can be scaled up to represent ten round lots, or 1,000 shares. The following 
approximation is used: 
TABLE 2 
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Distribution used for Trading Order Size 
Size 
Probability . 
- 
1 
50% 
3 
30% 
5 
10% 
10 
5% 
2 5 
5 %  
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Price Diffusion. The natural logarithm of the equilibrium value evolves according to a 
continuous random walk without return drift. To assure nonnegative prices, the log of price is 
used with e, as a normal, "white noise" term, yielding a log-normally distributed for the 
equilibrium price. 
In p,' = In p,-,* + e, 
where, e, - N(0,Ta2) 
Notice that the price diffusion process has the Martingale property, so that the current log price 
is an unbiased estimator of any subsequent price: 
E(ln p,' I In p,*) = In p,' for any T 
The price diffusion process and the sensitivity of the buy and sell order arrival rates to 
deviations from the equilibrium means that the dealers7 inventories will provide a noisy signal 
of the fundamental value. An increasing dealer position is denotative of quotes that are too high 
relative to the equilibrium value. Hence, allowing a larger position to build up is likely to h d  
to losses and potential bankruptcy. 
Specific Assumptions. Differences in the level of third market activity leads to performance 
characteristics that are compared under controlkd trading conditions. 
Specialist Policies. The principal rule the specialist must observe is aflrmative obligation 
which is describes in NYSE Rule 104,10(b) 
In connection with the maintenance of a fair and orderly market, it is commonly 
desirable that a member acting as specialist engage to a reasonable degree under 
existing circumstances, in dealing for his or her own account when lack of price 
continuity, lack of depth, or disparity between supply and demand exists or is 
reasonably to be anticipated. 
Affirmative obligation requires the specialist to make bid and offer quotes when limit orders do 
not provide sufficient liquidity. 
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The specialist's portfolio is assumed to consist of a single stock, where Q, is the number 
of shares held by the specialist immediately after a trade at time t is completed. The position 
at time t is summarized by the pair (c,, v,), where c, is cash on hand, and v, is the value of the 
shares held. Let q, be the specialist's net purchase (negative for sales, and positive for 
purchases) for the trade done at price P, at time t: 
Share portfolio: Qr = Qt-T + qt 
Cash: Ct = C1-T - qtPt 
Value of position: 
The specialist does not observe the equilibrium price, but follows an inventory-driven policy to 
set bid and ask quotes, and also strategically adjusts his quotes in response to limit orders on the 
book. The policies used are consistent with the profit-maximizing specialist policies derived by 
Conroy and Winkler (198 1, 1986). 
A position limit of 15 units of the security was used. If the specialist is long more than 
15 units or short more than 15 share, quotes are revised 'hth downward or upward for each trade 
until the position is reduced. A short position is similar to a negative inventory, or a back 
ordered condition. The dealer must later cover the short position with purchases at the 
prevailing market prices. The specialist's position is private information available only to him 
or her. The specialist adjusts quotes down when he or she is longer than limit, and adjusts 
upward when shorter. Larger position limits led to specialist losses, since quote revisions lag 
movement in the fundamental value of the stock. Smaller position limits reduced the extent of 
specialist participation without contributing to profitability. After some study, the specialist's 
spread in the simulations was set to $0.75 (about 2.3% of the stock's price). The specialist 
adjusts his or her quotes using private information on the state of the limit order book. A 
"thicker" limit order book on either the bid or offer side results in the specialist raising his bid 
or lowering his offer, thus narrowing the spread to compete with limit orders. A thinner book 
with fewer limit orders causes the specialist to widen his spread. 
Third Marker Dealer Policies. Similar to the specialist, the dealer's portfolio consists 
of the stock, where N, is the number of shares held by the dealer immediately after a trade at 
time t is completed and n, be the third market dealer's net purchase at time t. 
Share portfolio: Nt = NI-T + n, 
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Cash: ct = . c , -~  - ntPt 
Value of position: 
Similar to the specialist, the third market dealer does not observe the equilibrium price, but 
instead recognizes that changes in his or her position may reflect movement in the fundamental 
value of the security. Also the third market dealer's position, like the specialist's, is private 
information available only to him or her. In contrast to the specialist, the third market dealer 
only accepts small orders for 5 units or less. Small orders represent 90 percent of arriving 
orders and 52.1 percent of the arriving volume. When the third market dealer's position exceeds 
his or her limit, the dealer routes an offsetting order for the amount of his or her position limit 
to the main market place, where they execute against available limit orders on the book, or the 
specialist's quotes. For example, if the third market dealer has a long position of 14 and a 
position limit of 15, an investor's sell order for 3 units will raise the dealer's position to 17, 
which is beyond the limit. As a result, a sell order for his or her position limit of 15 will be 
transmitted to the specialist market to execute against the best available bid quotes in the market. 
Importantly, the trading ruks and quote adjustment policies for the specialist and off- 
exchange dealer lead to small positive trading profits. If their roles were not capable of 
generating economic rents, there would a withdrawal of dealers from the market, and a only a 
disintermediated market would be available to investors. 
Simulation Trace. To demonstrate the comparison of the two markets under one set of 
trading conditions, we consider a stock with a man interarrival time between orders of 4 
minutes, and set its initial equilibrium value at 33.00. Limit orders are expected to make up 
two-third of total order flow, and market orders from liquidity-motivated investors accounted 
for the other 33.3 percent of orders.' The equilibrium price varies according to a random walk 
process thereafter with standard deviation of daily returns of 3.0%, or about twice the average 
volatility of a stock in the S&P500 index. Limit orders that remain unexecuted after 6.5 hours 
' In 1989, limit orders were 51 % of the orders entered and 77% of the order volume entered on 
the DOT (Designated Order Turnaround) system, which itself accounts for 85% of all NYSE orders 
lRES901. 
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of trading time are canceled. Figure 3 is a trace of the simulation's execution over 20 minutes 
for the specialist market model. At 15:30, the order book state is displayed. 
FIGURE 3 
TRACE OF SIMULATION RUN OVER HALF HOUR PERIOD 
LIMIT ORDER TO SELL 10 AT 33.4 AT 15:20 
LIMIT ORDER TO SELL 5 AT 33.4 AT 15:29 
AT 15:30 VOLUME: 297 I EQUILB VALUE = 32.7 ORDERS : 109 
SPECIALIST QUOTES: TRADES: 36 
32.4-33.2 POS: 14 
-------- ORDER BOOK --------- 
BIDS PRICE OFFERS 
33.4 6 2 
33.3 20 2 
33.2 A, 5 1 
33.1 8 2 
33.0 
32.7 
32.6 
32.5 
3 15 Bs 32-4 
3 8 32.3 
2 15 32.2 
LIMIT ORDER TO BUY 5 AT 32.2 AT 15:40 
CANCELING STALE LIMIT SELL 5 AT 33.4 AT 15:40 
LIMIT ORDER TO SELL 10 AT 32.4 15:43 TRADES WITH 2 LIMIT BUYS AT 32.4 
MARKET ORDER TO SELL 5 AT 15:44 SELLS TO THIRD MARKET DEALER AT 32.4 
MARKET ORDER TO SELL 3 AT 15:49 SELLS TO SPECIALIST AT 32.4 
SPECIALIST POSITION RISES TO 17 EXCEEDING POSITION LIMIT - 
LOWERING QUOTES TO 32.3-33.1 
IV. Simulation Experiments and Results 
Seven different market conditions were tested, with eight replications lasting 100 trading 
days for each case. This provided a total data set equivalent to 7*8*100=5,600 trading days. 
Several parameters were held constant across the replications. 
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Each cell in Table 4 presents the averages of eight replications each covering 100 days 
of trading in a stock. The treatment variable is the third market dealer's share of small order 
Jlow, which is set at four different levels as indicated in the column headings. Notice that when 
the bypass share is 60%, the third market accounts for just under 20% of the aggregate trading 
volume. Common random variates are used, so that each of the eight replications represents 
identical sample paths for the stochastic environment variables used. By using this variance 
reduction technique, performance differences are attributable to changes in the control variable 
- the share of order flow to the third market dealer - rather than the particular sample paths 
of the model's random deviates. 
Model Input Parameter 
A round-trip represents the act of buying and later selling during the 100 day period. 
A round-trip using market orders pays a cost due to the spread between bid and offer prices, 
while a round-trip using limit orders realizes a gain from selling at the higher offer price and 
buying at the lower bid price. Limit orders however face the risk of not executing, and the risk 
that the price will move adversely while they are on the book. 
Value 
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Mean Order Arrival Rate 15 per hour 
Man  Volume Arrival 54.75 units per hour 
Limit Orders (% of Total) 66.7% 
Limit Orders Cancel if Unexecuted After 6.5 hours 
Standard Deviation of Daily Returns 3.00% 
Trading Day Length 6.5 hours 
Initial Equilibrium Price $33.00 
Specialist Position Limit 15 
Third Market Dealer Position Limit 15 
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.................... 
.............................. 
Third Market Dealer* 
Several observers have commented that the small trades routed to the third market trading 
systems "are likely to be those based on little or no private information. Since third market 
dealers generally operate proprietary (rather than open) trading systems, they can segment the 
order flow, and accept only that from brokers that are less likely to trade on price-sensitive 
information before the quotes used by the third market dealer have adjusted. In the model 
informed orders are the limit orders that are able to execute immediately due to transitory 
divergence between current quotes and the equilibrium value. Information is treated in a second 
way by routing 20 percent more of the uninformed order flow to the third market dealer, and 
10 percent less of the informed order flow to the third market dealer. For instance, in the 
experimental setting with 40 percent of the total small order flow going to the third market 
dealer, in the second scenario, 60 percent of the uninformed order flow will go to the third 
market dealer and just 30 percent of the informed. The proportion of the total order flow routed 
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to the dealer remains the same, but what arrives is less likely to be a result of a discrepancies 
between the equilibrium price and the extant market quotes. 
TABLE 5 
Space limitations preclude a full empirical validation of the output data. Based on several 
observable measures from the actual NYSE market, however, the models appear to provide a 
realistic representation. For instance, specialists on the NYSE participated as dealers in about 
18.4 % of trading volume in 1988 [NYSE89], compared with an average of 16.98 % participation 
in the simulation runs without a third market dealer. Other NYSE data that verifies the 
simulation's output are the probability of a limit order executing is 60.0%, which is similar to 
the 55.95% obtained as a simulation average [RESOO]. The ability to segment and receive only 
the less informed order flow raises the third market dealer's profitability, and intensifies the 
impact of third market activities. For instance, the dealers' proportion of trading volume 
increases when the third market dealer receives segmented order flow. 
. 
Impacts of Third Market Activity. Three principal impacts of third market activity are evident 
in the results of the simulation analysis. 
Information Treatment 11: Third Market Dealer receives 20% more than his .' 
market share -of uninformed order flow, and 10% less of the average informed : 
'order .fXows. ( *  -= six paired t-test significant at 0.01 level) 
THIRD MARKET DEALER'S SHARE OF SMALL ORDER FLOW 
Means over 8 sample runs 1 0 % 2 0% 40% 60% 
Arriving Orders 9,587 i 9,587 f 9,587; 9,587 
Volume 
...................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................... 
34,933 i 34,933 i 34,933 i 34,933 
.. 
Executed Trade Volume 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
23,974 i 23,670 ! 23,419 ! 23,454 
Spread* (as a % of mean price) i 1.52% 1.40% i 
.................................................................................................. .................................................................................................................................... 
1.30% i 1.22% 
*... 
Probability that a limit order i 
executes* 
...................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................... 
55.95% i 53.37% ! 50.56% ! 48.49% 
- 
Expected Time until limit order 
executes* (minutes) 
...................................................................................................... ...................................................................................... 
216 i 231 ! 250 ! 269 
................................................ 
Average Cost of a Round-Trip 0.028t i 0.04% 0.081t i 0.094C 
Transaction* = 0.09% i = 0.16% i = 0.26% i = 0.30% 
...................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................... 
Margins (ProfitsDealer Volume) 
Specialist 0.184%! -0.111%! 0.041%: 0.048% 
Third Market Dealer* na i 0.298% i 0.233% 0.212% 
......... ............................... 
0.184% i 0.176% i 0.141% i 0.151% A.~fg.r.egate ...D.e .rz..I.e.~shix! j .......................................... ............................................................................ 
Trading Volume as a % of Total i 
Specialist* 16.98% 14.82%; 13.22%! 12.35% 
Third Market Dealer* na i 
..................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................... 
7.83% i 14.37% i 20.81% 
Both Dealers' Trading Volume as i 
a % of Total* 16.98% i 22.65% i 27.59% i 33.16% 
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Impact 1. Competition from a third market dealer leads to narrower quotes, and a tighter bid- 
ask spread. The greater the share of order flow that bypasses the specialist order book, the 
larger the reduction in the posted spread in both treatments. When the third market dealer 
receives 60% of the small order flow, the spread falls 14.5 % and 19.7% from its base case 
under the two information treatments. Since the spread is a visible cost borne by investors, this 
effect improves the quality of the market, and should raise liquidity. 
Orders that bypass the limit order book do not execute, and remove orders and price 
quotes in the main market. As a result limit orders that would have executed remain on the 
book longer, narrowing the spread in many cases. Also, greater third market volumes siphon 
trading away from the specialist, who is less likely to need to changes quotes in response to an 
excess inventory position. 
Im~act 2. Limit orders are disadvantaged at higher levels of third market activity. They are 
less likely to execute, and remain in the book longer before execution. The probability of 
execution falls over 5 % and 7% under the two information scenarios as the third market dealer's 
share increases. The expected wait time before execution rises from its base case of 3 hours 36 
minutes by about a hour with 60% small order share for the third market dealer. Because more 
of the orders that execute are market orders that pay the spread cost (buy at the offer and sell 
at the bid), the average round-trip transactions cost increases from its base of 0.09% of the 
average share price to 0.22% and 0.330% when the third market dealer receives 60% of the small 
order flow. A clientele effect is evident when third market activity increases. Namely, limit 
orders are less attractive when a substantial proportion of the order flow is routed away from 
the central order book and to a third market dealer. Market orders receive better treatment 
because narrower spreads reduce the cost of immediate executions. 
Imvact 3. Although third market activity reduces the specialist's trading volumes, greater bypass 
levels increases the overall role of dealers in the market. Without a third market dealer, the 
specialist's trading is about 17.0% of the total trading volume. When the third market dealer 
receives 60% of the small order flow in the two information treatments, the two dealers 
combined account for 31.1 % and 33.2% of the aggregate trading volume. Third market activity 
and bypass of the main market leads to greater dealerization of trading. Since one of the 
objectives of the NMS is to provide the opportunities for investors' orders to be executed 
without the participation of a dealer, this is a drawback. 
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V. Interpretation and Conclusion 
Electronic markets have received considerable attention from researchers and practitioners 
because of their recognized benefits in reducing search costs, and improving coordination and 
monitoring in business relationships. The consequences of immediate and wide dissemination 
of information that occurs in elect~onic markets remains to be thoroughly examined. This 
research has demonstrated that market transparency can have substantial consequences by 
creating, in financial markets at least, profitable opportunities to bypass markets that generates 
the information. The dilemmas analyzed, are suggestive of a broad range of issues that will 
confront the organizations that implement electronic markets for products, services, or financial 
instruments. 
In the U.S. securities markets, dissemination of market data has equipped several firms 
to develop competing, off-exchange trading mechanisms that rely on market price data, but 
whose transactions bypass the established market. As demonstrated with a simple model of 
order arrival and trading, there are significant differences in market performance and quality 
when bypass and third-market activity increases. These effects, however, are not unambiguously 
favorable or unfavorable. Information plays too great a role both as a signalling device and a 
bypass tool in many industries to make a simple conclusion the electronic markets are only for 
the better. 
Much of the current controversy, and many of the views on off-exchange trading in the 
U.S. are colored by partisan interests. The exchanges and the third market dealers that bypass 
them are adversaries, each claiming higher ground. Not surprisingly, the specialist's profits and 
margins are negatively related to third market volumes; off-exchange dealing activity reduces 
specialist's earnings. William Donaldson, chairman of the NYSE, claims that "when someone 
is making an OTC (third) market in NYSE stocks, they are living off the NYSE. They make 
markets and turn around and lay off their risk in the central marketpla~e."~ Advocates of off- 
exchange trading point to increased choice and competition, and trading innovations such as 
automatic execution systems and 3-4 second turnaround time for order executions put in place 
by third market dealers. 
The response may be more sophisticated electronic stock markets that integrate multiple 
trading mechanisms, and reduce the incentives for bypass. Steven Wunsch, developer of the 
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Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX) argues for "trying to centralize trading through a combination * 
of old rules and new technology." Because full information might weaken the incentive to 
submit orders to a transparent market, to prevent bypass, electronic market providers must J 
determine what information dissemination strategy will maximize overall market benefits. 
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